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according to which the extension of social justice beyond bounded communities would be 
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Rawlsian statism, liberal nationalism, and civic republicanism - as solutions to this problem. It 
then examines, and rejects, three prominent objections, each denying a different level of the 
argument. The article concludes that the civic republican version of the argument is the most 
plausible, and implications for cosmopolitanism are considered. 
Keywords: Civic Republicanism, Cosmopolitanism, Liberal Nationalism, Motivation, 
Stability, Rawls. 
  
                                                 
1 Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellow, European University Institute, Via dei Roccettini, 9, 50014 San Domenico di 
Fiesole. Lior.erez@eui.eu. 
 
 2 
 
Cosmopolitanism about justice often faces the following objection. In order for a conception 
of social justice to be fully justified, it needs to be stable. For a conception of social justice to 
be stable, it must be able to motivate people to endorse it as regulative of their behavior, that 
is, as superior to their strategic, self-interested reasons. As this motivational precondition is not 
available globally, cosmopolitans’ aspiration to globalize social justice would be unstable, and 
thus otiose. Importantly, the role that motivation plays in this argument is as a normative 
precondition for the justification of the cosmopolitan ideal, rather than merely as a constraint 
on its practical implementation which leaves the cosmopolitan ideal intact. The precise nature 
of this objection, however, remains unclear.  
In this article, I address this gap by formulating and defending a version of this objection to 
cosmopolitanism, hereafter referred to as “political motivation argument” (PMA). I wish to 
demonstrate that, at least with regards to major versions of the motivational critique of 
cosmopolitanism, this argument is best construed as a response to the stability problem – 
maintaining that any conception of social justice must be shown to be stable if it is to be fully 
justified. Following this thought, I reconstruct three versions of the PMA – Rawlsian statism, 
liberal nationalism, and civic republicanism – as responses to the stability problem, and argue 
that civic republicanism is the most plausible, both in comparison to alternative accounts, and 
in light of possible objections. 
 As a starting point, I suggest the following preliminary reconstruction of the PMA. At this 
stage, clearly, this general structure will leave some important questions unanswered. 
Nevertheless, I believe that it will also allow for a clear comparison between versions of the 
objection, as well as a better understanding of what, precisely, is under dispute between 
cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans.  What shall remain constant throughout is my reading 
of the particular version of cosmopolitanism about justice under attack: that is, 
cosmopolitanism as a normative, action-guiding theory, with a commitment to a concrete 
political ideal of the global order. The distinguishing feature of these accounts as cosmopolitan 
is that, whatever ideal of social justice they hold is justified within bounded societies, should 
be extended beyond them. This rather broad definition is meant to meet three desiderata. First, 
it is meant to be inclusive across different positions regarding the principles of social justice 
and the currency of justice.2 Second, it is meant to exclude those who are moral cosmopolitans 
in the weaker sense – i.e., who endorse universal moral equality without being committed to 
the globalization of social justice, even if some other normative standards apply globally. And 
finally, it aims to remain agnostic with respect to the particular institutional claims made by 
these cosmopolitans – for example, whether they argue in support of a world state; a federation 
of democratic republics; multi-layered, decentralized corporatism; or some other 
transformation of existing sovereign state-based world order.3  
                                                 
2 Of course, cosmopolitan theorists hold diverse accounts of the principles of social justice and its extension 
beyond the state, including, but not limited to: a Global Difference Principle (e.g. Charles R. Beitz, Political 
Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Darrel Moellendorf, 
Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002).); Global Equality of Opportunities (e.g. Simon 
Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities,” Metaphilosophy 32, no. 1–2 (2001): pp. 113–34); 
Global Basic Income (e.g. Philippe Van Parijs, “Basic Income for All,” Boston Review 25, no. 5 (2000): pp. 4–
8.). The general structure of my argument applies across these variations. 
3 For alternative definitions of cosmopolitanism, see the discussion in Samuel Scheffler, “Conceptions of 
Cosmopolitanism,” Utilitas 11, no. 03 (1999), pp. 255–76; Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism,” in A Companion 
to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas W. Pogge, 2nd ed. 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 312–32. 
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In its general form, the PMA draws its conclusion from three premises and a factual claim: 
The Political Motivation Argument  
1. The Cosmopolitan Ideal: Cosmopolitanism about justice calls for the extension of 
the ideal of social justice beyond bounded societies.  
2. The Motivational Precondition premise: the normative ideal of social justice 
requires, as a necessary precondition, a widespread disposition M among participants 
in the social scheme in order to be stable.   
3. The Generating Feature premise: M is present and widespread among participants 
of a social scheme when it is generated by feature F. 
4. Factual Claim: The generating feature F does not, and cannot exist beyond bounded 
societies.  
From 1-4, it follows that  
5.  The ideal of social justice cannot be stable beyond bounded societies, and so is not 
justified beyond bounded societies. 
Therefore,  
Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism is not fully justified. 
In the rest of this article, I would turn to fill in the gaps of this general structure – the content 
of the motivational precondition M and the generating feature F, the basis for the factual claim, 
and the nature of “bounded societies”. These variables are understood differently by the three 
positions I reconstruct below.  
My argument proceeds as follows. In the first section, I provide an account of the stability 
problem, which lies at the heart of the PMA, and is crucial for the validity of the argument. In 
the second and third section, I reconstruct the ways in which the three versions of the PMA I 
discuss address this problem, and how anti-cosmopolitan conclusions follow from them, first 
by addressing the deficiencies of the Rawlsian and nationalist accounts, and then turning to the 
preferred civic republican account. In the fourth section, I address three cosmopolitan 
objections, with each corresponding to a premise in the general structure of the argument. 
Properly understood, I argue that the political motivation argument, in its republican version, 
poses a serious challenge that cosmopolitans cannot afford to ignore. The upshot of my 
argument is that cosmopolitan theorists should either provide a suitable account of motivational 
stability, or hone up the radical conclusions of their own argument. 
1. The Stability Problem 
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The starting point of this analysis is the stability problem, as articulated in Rawls’s Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism.4 In Rawls’s formulation, principles of justice are constructed 
in the original position by “artificial” persons, who, while ignorant of their own conception of 
the good, are able to make general assumptions regarding the nature of the good that they would 
want to pursue. As has been pointed out by several recent accounts, however, this stage is only 
a pro tanto justification of a conception of justice. 5 For a conception of justice to be fully 
justified, it has to be shown that it would be stable, that is, that people with differing 
conceptions of the good will come to endorse it. 6 The question of stability is not a problem to 
be dealt with later, once the right conception of justice has been chosen and justified. It is, 
rather, part of the justification process itself.7 
In what way would any particular conception of justice fail to engender a desire to act upon it? 
The problem of stability arises when the two moral powers recognized by Rawls - the sense of 
justice and the rational pursuit of the good - are in conflict. This clash is inevitable because of 
the pluralist nature of different individuals’ interests, what Rawls calls the “fact of pluralism” 
in liberal society.  This pluralism is not a result of an unfortunate reality; it is rather “the natural 
outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free institutions.”8 Because of the 
burdens of judgment, i.e., the limitations on practical reason, even rational people acting in 
good faith will disagree in their moral and philosophical judgments.   
Given the potential clash between the principles of justice and their interests, each individual 
in the well-ordered society is faced with what Rawls calls a “generalized prisoner’s dilemma”: 
while each could potentially maximize their interests by regulating their behavior in accordance 
with the principles of justice, each is faced with the temptation to defect, or free-ride, as to 
improve one’s position at the expense of others.  
This scenario could be represented with two social actors, A and B, and units of welfare. If A 
and B both cooperate, they will each receive 2 units, while mutual defection will result in one 
unit each. If A cooperates and B defects, A will receive nothing while B will get 3 units (the 
same logic applies when B cooperates and A defects). Defecting is the dominant strategy for 
any rational actor, since no matter what the other actor does, it is always rational to defect. 
Since both actors are rational, this results in the sub-optimal case of mutual defection being a 
dominant strategy. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
                                                 
4 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) and Political Liberalism 
(Columbia University Press, 1993); Hereafter TJ and PL, respectively.  
5 For two influential recent accounts, see Samuel Freeman, “Congruence and the Good of Justice,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 277–
315; Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
6 TJ, p. 145/125. [Page numbers for TJ references refer first to the original 1971 version, and then to the 1999 
revised version, 16th Edition.] 
7 Rawls writes that “A conception of justice “is seriously defective if the principles of moral psychology are such 
that it fails to engender in human beings the requisite desire to act upon it”. TJ, p. 455/398. 
8 PL, p. xxiv. 
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 B Makes Justice Regulative 
(cooperate) 
B Decides Case-by-Case 
(defect) 
A Makes Justice Regulative 2,2 0,3 
A Decides Case-by-Case 3,0 1,1 
Table 1: Generalized Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Even if it could be shown that each individual would prefer everyone’s actions to be regulated 
by the principles of justice, we are still faced with the problem of the “Assurance Game.” In 
this scenario, unlike the prisoner’s dilemma, each prefers mutual cooperation to self-interested 
defection, and prefers to comply, if all (or most) others comply. But since each prefers to defect 
if all others defect, rather than to suffer the costs of picking up the slack when others free-ride, 
the situation is still unstable unless all can be assured that others will cooperate. 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 B Makes Justice Regulative 
(cooperate) 
B Decides Case-by-Case 
(defect) 
A Makes Justice Regulative 2,2 0,1 
A Decides Case-by-Case 1,0 1,1 
Table 2: Assurance Game 
Unless some sort of mutual assurance is provided that others will not defect, people would 
prefer to reject the ideal of justice as regulative. The principles of justice will be unstable and 
thus, otiose.9 
There are, therefore, two issues to be solved in order to secure the stability of the normative 
ideal of justice. First, that people will have an active sense of justice; and second, that the 
principles of justice will be regulative of people’s behavior, i.e., that even when people are 
faced with the opportunity to defect they will not do so. In other words, it needs to be shown 
that it will be rational for people to grant justice a regulative status in their practical reasoning. 
In Rawls’s terms, “the hazards of the generalized prisoner's dilemma are removed by the match 
between the right and the good”, or, differently stated, between the reasonable and the 
                                                 
9 Cf. the analysis in Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, pp. 43–51. 
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rational.10 The challenge for any account of justice, therefore, is to demonstrate how the right 
and the good will be matched, without relying on a fortunate contingency. 
Note that this way of articulating the stability problem avoids two common misconceptions 
about Rawls’s account. First, it is clear that the problem does not belong to the realm of non-
ideal theory: i.e., it does not ask how we get non-compliant citizens to comply with justified 
conceptions of justice in the actual social world.11 Second, some of Rawls’s readers assume 
that, since the stability problem is discussed within ideal theory, it is resolved with the 
introduction of the sense of justice.12  In Rawls’s moral psychology, however, the desire to do 
what is just is conditional upon the knowledge that others would reciprocate; a conception of 
right does not have independent motivating power, unrelated to any rational ends, as this cannot 
account for any reason-giving power of the sense of justice, and the decision to make justice 
regulative of other desires becomes arbitrary.13  Importantly, even if the sense of justice has 
some motivating power, it needs to be shown that it will be regulative of people’s conceptions 
of the good in order to solve the assurance problem. 14 
2. Reconstructing the Rawlsian and Liberal Nationalist Solutions 
With this understanding of the stability problem, I now turn to consider two dominant versions 
of the PMA: Rawlsian statism and liberal nationalism. The purpose of this section is twofold. 
First, I will argue that these accounts are structurally similar, and could be plausibly read as 
solutions to the stability problem. Second, by considering these accounts as solutions to the 
stability problem, I will demonstrate the deficiencies of the Rawlsian and nationalist accounts, 
and the need for a plausible alternative. 
2.1. Rawlsian statism 
In Rawls’s original solution to the stability problem in Part III of TJ, he argued that rational 
members of the well-ordered society would view themselves as free and equal moral persons, 
and would have a desire to express their nature as such by acting upon principles of justice. 15 
In PL, however, Rawls states that relying on this argument is problematic, as “it is not 
consistent with the view as a whole”.16 The problem is that the argument fails to appreciate the 
extent of the fact of pluralism. If pluralism is the result of free institutions, then a reliance on 
any particular conception of the good to solve the stability problem simply begs the question.  
                                                 
10 TJ, p. 577/505. 
11 For a recent (otherwise convincing) example, see Naima Chahboun, “Nonideal Theory and compliance—A 
Clarification,” European Journal of Political Theory 14, no. 2 (2015), pp. 229-245. As Rawls explicitly states, in 
describing the stability problem, we are “...still limiting ourselves to strict compliance theory.” (TJ, pp. 513–
514/450).  
12 For this assumption see, for example, Brian Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” Ethics 105, no. 4 
(1995), pp. 874-915 at pp. 885–886.  
13 TJ, pp. 478/419. 
14 Pace Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” pp. 883–884; cf. Freeman, “Congruence and the Good 
of Justice,” pp. 281–283, 286–289; Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, p. 126. 
15 TJ, p. 252/222;  See Freeman, “Congruence and the Good of Justice,” pp. 290–297 and Weithman, Why Political 
Liberalism?, Ch. 7 (and particularly pp. 184–189), on this so-called “Kantian Congruence Argument”. 
16 PL, p. xvi. 
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Rawls’s response was to move from the moral to the political: what maintains stability is not a 
comprehensive moral doctrine, but a shared conception of the citizen, compatible with various 
reasonable conceptions of the good. Rawls argues that by sharing a political culture, each 
individual could affirm this shared conception from her own moral lights. For liberals this 
would be an easier task, but other citizens could affirm the political conception from their own 
substantive reasons.  Thus, in the well-ordered society, different reasonable conceptions of the 
good would converge on a shared political conception.17  
This, so far, is familiar territory. What I argue here is that Rawls’s anti-cosmopolitan position 
in Law of Peoples can be understood through his solution to the stability problem in Political 
Liberalism. The merit of this reading, I believe, is that it demonstrates a coherence in Rawls’s 
writing and explains the foundation of his anti-cosmopolitanism.18 While there may be 
alternative explanations for Rawls’s anti-cosmopolitanism, I argue that it is a plausible way to 
interpret the implications of his account the question of global justice.19 
To understand this move, it is important to see that for Rawls, the political solution to the 
stability problem is not a claim about individual desires and motivations – that is, each person’s 
idiosyncratic moral identity - but is based upon a shared political culture. Through such 
political culture, the conception-based desire to be a certain kind of citizen is brought into 
people’s subjective motivational sets, albeit in an indirect and informal manner.20 Without it, 
there will be no overlapping consensus among reasonable citizens on the conception of the 
citizen, and thus no basis for reasonable agreement. In that case, there will be no assurance 
that, at least generally, other citizens will act as justice requires and will not free-ride, and such 
a society would not be stable.  
The society of which citizens are members is conceived of as “self-contained and as having no 
relations with other societies”21, and as such there is no global public culture to provide a shared 
conception of the citizen. Individuals would therefore not be motivated to make justice 
regulative of their public action, because they would lack the assurance that others would do 
the same. The missing motivational precondition is therefore a constraint on any account of 
global justice that seeks to globalize the original position, and Rawls considers it a fatal one 
                                                 
17 See Freeman, “Congruence and the Good of Justice,” p. 307. 
18 For stability interpretations of LoP, see Leif Wenar, “Why Rawls Is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian,” in Rawls’s 
Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, ed. Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 
95–113, and Hyunseop Kim, “A Stability Interpretation of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples,” Political Theory 43, no. 
4 (2015), pp. 473-499. In his recent book, Aaron James advances a critique of cosmopolitanism which relies on 
an interpretation of the problem of assurance, albeit leading to different conclusions. Fairness in Practice: A 
Social Contract for a Global Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 103–31. 
19. Textual support for my reading is cited in Katrina Forrester, “Citizenship, War and the Origins of International 
Ethics in American Political Philosophy 1960-1975,” The Historical Journal 57, no. 3 (2014): pp. 773–801 at p. 
789fn53. 
20 PL, pp. 107–110. 
21 PL, p. 12. 
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for cosmopolitan positions that seek to extend his domestic theory of justice. They are not, in 
other words, realistic utopias.22  
This reflects the premises given by the general structure of the PMA, whose Rawlsian version 
takes the following form: 
1.  Cosmopolitanism about justice calls for the extension of the ideal of social justice 
beyond the boundaries of well-ordered societies. 
2. The ideal of social justice requires, as a necessary precondition for its stability, a 
widespread sense of mutual trust (M) among participants in the social scheme to assure 
them that others will comply. 
3. A sense of mutual trust is present in bounded societies as a consequence of a shared 
political conception of the citizen (F) that members of well-ordered societies share, as 
a result of their political culture. 
4. There is no shared political culture, and thus no shared political conception of the 
citizen, beyond the boundaries of well-ordered societies. 
From 1-4, it follows that 
5. The ideal of social justice cannot be stable beyond the boundaries of well-ordered 
societies. 
Therefore, given the stability problem 
Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism is not fully justified. 
Note that, by denying the existence of a global shared conception of the citizen, Rawls is not 
denying the existence or desirability of certain international norms, which may well derive 
from a “global political culture” in a broader sense. This explains, for example, why 
international norms such as the duty to assist burden societies do not generate motivational 
concerns for him, even when he recognizes that the lack of affinity between peoples may pose 
some practical constraints for implementation.23 Similarly, certain norms of justice between 
peoples (most importantly those related to trade and warfare) achieve their stability in a process 
analogous to that described in PL.24 Yet Rawls is explicit that these norms are different from 
those governing the relations of social justice between citizens within a well-ordered society, 
with global “political culture” regulating the behavior of peoples, rather than individuals. 
Nevertheless, as many of Rawls’s critics have rightly pointed out, this version of the PMA 
seems arbitrarily statist. Rawls merely stipulates that the political conception of the citizen is 
                                                 
22As he writes, “… I draw on a psychological principle that social learning of moral attitudes supporting political 
institutions works most effectively through society-wide shared institutions and practices… In a realistic utopia 
this psychological principle sets limits to what can sensibly be proposed as the content of the Law of Peoples” 
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 112 fn.44. [hereafter LoP] 
23 LoP, pp. 112-113. In thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this particular challenge. 
24 LoP, pp. 44-54, with reference to the stability of democratic peace. 
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limited to within the borders of the territorial state, yet he does not substantiate this fundamental 
claim, either empirically or normatively.25 Onora O’Neill famously argued that Rawls in 
assuming an idealized closed society, while “it is all too well known that in real life persons 
are often unsure about their sense(s) of political identity, that they may find that those with 
whom they live in closed societies are not identical with those whom they regard as their own 
people, and that not all societies are closed”.26 In the global context, this becomes particularly 
problematic: given that the role of idealization in Rawls’s framework was to abstract from 
morally irrelevant features of individuals, introducing state borders into ideal theory seems to 
betray a fundamental commitment.  
Furthermore, Rawls’s account with regards to the nature of public culture and the shared 
conception of the citizen is suspiciously weak. Given that it is focused on an allegiance to public 
reason and their honouring of the duty of civility27, the Rawlsian conception of the citizen is 
taken to be too abstract to motivate public spiritedness among members of a political society, 
specifically when it endorses a strict private-public distinction between the public conception 
of justice and the private conceptions of the good.28 This is exacerbated with Rawls’s 
inconsistency with regards to the nature of citizenship and political society: At points, he is 
insistent that a political society is not a community, as members do not share a common end, 
but merely converge on some shared public interest; yet elsewhere, he maintains that the public 
conception of the citizen requires sharing a common political end, thus blurring the distinction 
between a comprehensive community and political society as a “union of social unions”.29 
These two deficiencies suggest a tension in Rawls’s position, both as a critique of 
cosmopolitanism and as a solution to the stability problem. In other words, Rawls’s account of 
public culture in his version of the PMA is incomplete: it has to specify why a shared political 
culture is bounded to a specific society in particular, and could not be considered globally; and 
it has to show that the public conception of the citizen would be thick enough to overcome the 
stability problem. The liberal nationalist and civic republican versions, to which I turn next, 
can be read as working within the general framework of the Rawlsian version, while providing 
a thicker description of the public conception of the citizen. 
2.2. Liberal nationalism  
                                                 
25 See for example Onora O’Neill, “Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism,” The Philosophical Review 106, no. 3 (1997), pp. 411-428; Thomas Pogge, “An Egalitarian 
Law of Peoples”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23 (1994), pp. 195-224; Andrew Kuper, “Rawlsian Global 
Justice: Beyond the Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law of Persons”, Political Theory, 28 (2000), pp. 640–74.  
26 O’Neill, pp. 419-420. 
27 PL., p. 485. 
28 Andrés De Francisco, “A Republican Interpretation of the Late Rawls,” Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no. 
3 (2006): pp. 270–288; G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2008), pp. 183–96.   
29 See Richard Dagger, “Citizenship as Fairness: John Rawls’s Conception of Civic Virtue” in A Companion to 
Rawls, ed. Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), pp. 297-312 at p. 308. 
 10 
 
The liberal nationalist argument against cosmopolitanism could be understood as arising from 
concerns about motivational stability, structurally similar to the Rawlsian version.30 There are, 
however, two considerable differences between the standard Rawlsian and nationalist accounts. 
First, the necessary motivation identified by the nationalist account is thicker: liberal 
nationalists argue that not only mutual trust, but solidarity is “crucial for the functioning of a 
liberal state in general, and a liberal welfare state in particular.”31 Solidarity is interpreted here 
as a motivational precondition consists in “members [giving] each other’s interests some non-
instrumental weight in their practical reasoning”.32 This captures the sense in which solidarity 
is not merely the overlapping of individual interests, but denotes also the willingness to 
sacrifice personal gains for the collective good. Limiting social justice to what can regulate 
reciprocal relations of mutual interest will fail to capture what is valuable about the welfare 
state. Any account that explains the welfare state without relying on solidarity, it is argued, 
either cannot explain its existence, or is implicitly assuming solidarity.33 This takes a similar 
form to G.A Cohen’s critique of Rawls, and his proposal of a socialist ethos that will non-
coercively redirect the well-off to restrict their anti-egalitarian demands.34 The logic of the 
liberal nationalist PMA is similar, although clearly the precise nature of the ethos advocated is 
different.35 
The second element of the liberal nationalist PMA, which is crucial for its anti-cosmopolitan 
conclusions, is that the motivational precondition can only be stably generated by a shared 
national identity, which does not have a global equivalent. While this is sometimes conflated 
with the first point, it is crucial to separate here the question of (i) what is the required 
motivation (trust and solidarity), and second (ii) what generates this motivation (national 
identity). Indeed, as I will demonstrate below, it is possible to accept that solidarity is a 
motivational precondition for social justice without accepting that a shared national identity is 
the only way in which it could come about. For the liberal nationalist PMA, however, whether 
we think that this motivational precondition is captured by the thicker conception of solidarity 
or by the thinner conception of social trust, these dispositions could only be stably generated 
by a shared national identity. 
The liberal nationalist PMA, then, takes the following form: 
1.  Cosmopolitanism about justice calls for the extension of the ideal of social justice 
beyond the boundaries of national communities. 
                                                 
30. For a similar comparison between the Rawlsian stability argument and the liberal nationalist argument, see 
Jonathan Seglow, “Universals and Particulars: The Case of Liberal Cultural Nationalism,” Political Studies 46, 
no. 5 (1998), pp. 963-977 at pp. 970–971. Against this comparison, see Sune Lægaard, “Feasibility and Stability 
in Normative Political Philosophy: The Case of Liberal Nationalism,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9, no. 
4 (2006): pp. 399-416. 
31 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 96.  
32 Andrew Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 27. 
33 David Miller, “Nationality: Some Replies,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 14, no. 1 (1997), pp. 69-82 at p. 70. 
34  Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, pp. 183–196. 
35 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 121; see also Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory 
(Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998), p. 28. 
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2. The ideal of social justice requires, as a necessary precondition, a widespread sense 
of trust and solidarity (M) among participants in the social scheme.   
3. The necessary sense of trust and solidarity is present in national communities, as a 
consequence of the national identity (F) members of these societies share. 
4. There is no equivalent for a national identity beyond the boundaries of national 
communities. 
From 1-4, it follows that 
5. The ideal of social justice cannot be stable beyond national communities. 
Therefore, given the stability problem, 
Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism is not fully justified. 
One clear advantage of this position is that, in contrast with the abstract Rawlsian account of 
public culture, it seems clear that there is no global equivalent for national identity. Of course, 
to claim that national identity only exists within national communities is almost trivial. The 
precise account of national identity must be unpacked, so it can be shown to be both sufficiently 
particularist and plausibly generate the required motivational disposition. Unfortunately, the 
three common liberal nationalist answers to this question suffer from considerable deficiencies. 
The first possibility is to interpret national identity as a group identity, that is, to view national 
membership as equivalent to other involuntary associations which generate a sense of 
commitment and solidarity, first and foremost the family.36 This sense of commitment does not 
depend on any particular ethical value of these relationships; I may be in radical disagreement 
with my brother about fundamental issues, yet our familial relationship, insofar as it is part of 
my practical identity, would still generate a sense of concern for him. This account, however, 
is highly problematic; unless implausibly strong assumption about kinship and the place of 
national identity in the lives of individuals are accepted, the analogy between family and nation 
does not hold.37  
The second account of national identity tracks trust to a shared societal culture.38 First, sharing 
a language and cultural background facilitates communication between citizens, which 
mitigates epistemic barriers to trust; second, sharing a common culture and norms with others 
– including norms of incentives and punishment - makes their behavior more predictable to us, 
and therefore lowers the threshold for trusting that others would do as we expect. Shared 
cultural norms are of course not sufficient for trust – I may distrust you precisely because we 
                                                 
36 A version of this claim may be found in Thomas Hurka, “The Justification of National Partiality,” in The 
Morality of Nationalism, ed. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 139–
58; David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 3. Note that my discussion here 
does not address the question of whether these relationship generate associative obligations, only whether they 
generate the right kind of motivation. 
37 See for example Jeff McMahan, “The Limits of National Partiality,” in McKim and McMahan (eds.), The 
Morality of Nationalism, pp. 107–38. 
38 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, New Ed edition (Oxford; New 
York: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 76. 
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share these norms and I believe you violate them.  But they are nevertheless, in this account, 
close to being a necessary condition.39 However, this account is deficient as a solution to the 
stability problem: a societal culture does not necessarily give members a reason to see social 
justice as regulative of practical reasoning, even less to grant others who share their societal 
culture a non-instrumental place in their reasoning.  
The third account seeks to transcend the problems of the above views, by interpreting national 
identity as representing valuable ethical relationships between members of the national 
community, and viewing trust as a product of this pursuit of a shared good. Members of a 
national community view this shared identity as a pre-political common good, and this in turn 
generates certain special obligations between them, not least the obligation to promote and 
sustain this shared identity.40  The value of this shared identity might be interpreted in a 
contextualist way, constituted by the shared belief in it, or based on some objective grounds.41 
If we have a reason to believe that fellow-citizens share a commitment to the promotion of a 
common good, then we have a prima facie reason to trust their motives and actions. As fellow 
nationals, we might disagree on the ways to promote this good, but our disagreement is 
contained within the broader meta-consensus on what our shared good is.42  
This view of national identity is more successful than the first two at providing an ethical basis 
for solidarity without the pitfalls of the family analogy. Yet it remains deficient on two 
accounts. First, empirically speaking, the link between a strong national identity and robust 
institutions of social justice is contingent at best.43 Liberal nationalists may, of course, contain 
this charge by pointing out that the shared conceptions of good may be plural between 
communities. Indeed, there is nothing in this account that necessitates any particular view on 
social justice, and the sense of national identity is seen only a necessary condition, but not a 
sufficient one. Given the nature of the stability problem, however, this answer is less than 
satisfactory; it seems to achieve stability through a social ideal which is in itself external to the 
conception of social justice.  
Even if the liberal nationalist is able to accommodate this concern, a more troubling point is 
that the boundaries of national communities and the borders of the state are rarely congruent. 
Following the logic of the argument, this would lead us to the conclusion that, implausibly, the 
ideal of social justice cannot be stable within multinational states, and could be stable for 
national communities across borders.44 A plausible liberal nationalist argument must either 
broaden the definition of national identity to fit the boundaries of the nation-state,  argue that 
multinational states are prone to secession, or, more commonly, maintain different cultural 
affiliations are “nested” within a larger, encompassing national identity.45 This latter route is 
                                                 
39 Miller, On Nationality, pp. 92–94. 
40 Ibid., 188. 
41 Respectively: Miller, On Nationality; Hurka, “The Justification of National Partiality”; cf. Margaret Moore, 
The Ethics of Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 26–41. 
42 For a similar analysis, see Matthew Festenstein, “National Identity, Political Trust and the Public Realm,” 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 12, no. 2 (2009): pp. 279-296 at p. 284. 
43 See David Miller and Sundas Ali, “Testing the National Identity Argument,” European Political Science Review 
6, no. 2 (2014): pp. 237–59. 
44 Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism, pp. 94–98.  
45 David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), pp. 127–132.  
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promising, but it comes at a cost: the way in which co-nationals share a common identity, and 
the cultural elements relevant to this identity, become much more restricted. 
3. The Civic Republican Alternative 
With the respective deficiencies of the Rawlsian and liberal nationalist accounts in mind, we 
can now turn to the third version of the PMA, which draws on the civic republican tradition. 
The civic republican argument, I argue, mitigates the flaws of the Rawlsian and liberal 
nationalist accounts identified above, and could be read as an improved, more plausible version 
of both.  
A common reading of civic republicanism is as an alternative to liberal political morality.46 
Against the liberal focus on liberty as non-interference, civic republicans have placed their 
emphasis on liberty as freedom from domination by an arbitrary power, both public and private. 
This conception of liberty as non-domination as a primary good has led republicans to prefer 
constitutional institutions and a more engaged mode of citizenship as an antidote to the abuse 
of political power by corrupt elites. While the liberal conception of the citizen is thought of as 
a nexus of rights, which are construed in a negative manner, republican citizenship is a status 
that carries with it more stringent positive duties. It is thus more demanding of the individual 
citizen – it requires that people not only avoid harm to others and obey the law, but willingly 
share in practices of social cooperation and make considerable compromises and sacrifices for 
the sake of the common good of being not dominated. 
Accordingly, civic republicanism demands strong ties of obligation and solidarity among 
citizens who maintain each other’s freedom from domination. Yet unlike the liberal nationalist 
version, these strong ties are not the result of pre-political identification with other members of 
the community. Rather, this is an allegiance to a certain political way of life, or a “love of 
country”, a sense of “belonging to a polity”, in which citizens see the flourishing of institutions 
and practices as linked to their own political freedom.47  Citizens in a republican polity are 
linked by sense of collegiality, and are perceived as sharing a common political good of non-
domination.48  
The motivational precondition here is not a particular motivation, but rather a cluster of 
motivations grouped under “civic virtue”. Citizens are to be motivated to (a) resist being 
dominated by an arbitrary power, (b) avoid dominating others, and (c) protect others from non-
domination by third parties. In other words, for the normative ideal of social justice, understood 
here as non-domination, to be stable, citizens must see acting by civic virtues as regulative of 
the other desires and interests they may have, and, crucially, trust that other citizens are doing 
the same. While virtuous citizens must be vigilant against the abuse of trust by political 
                                                 
46 See Cécile Laborde and John Maynor, eds., Republicanism and Political Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). 
47 Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging, p. 127. 
48 See for example Iseult Honohan, “Friends, Strangers or Countrymen? The Ties between Citizens as 
Colleagues,” Political Studies 49, no. 1 (2001): pp. 51–69 
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institutions and fellow-citizens, the role of trust in institutions and fellow-citizens is crucial for 
maintaining the practices of republican citizenship.49 
One may object, at this point, that this account of civic motivation is overly abstract and 
unrealistic. Unlike appeals to constitutional essentials or national identity, which are a familiar 
features of actual political discourse, can we really expect citizens to be motivated by such 
high-minded ideals as non-domination?50 As a matter of fact, however, opposing domination 
and resisting arbitrary power are very common and effective tropes in the rhetoric of political 
parties and movements, both historically and presently. Consider the following examples. 
National liberation movements’ appeal not only to a shared cultural identity, but to the value 
of self-determination and resistance to foreign rule. Ideals of non-domination were also 
prevalent in abolitionist and anti-apartheid rhetoric, powerfully captured in Nelson Mandela’s 
famous 1964 speech during the Rivonia trial, where he describes the struggle against white and 
black domination as an ideal worth dying for51; And finally – though with obviously far less 
world historical significance - the  success of the recent campaign for the United Kingdom 
leave of the European Union (“Brexit”) was attributed, to a large degree, to the rhetorical power 
of “taking control” back from political elites and  Brussels bureaucrats. The validity and 
desirability of each of these particular arguments may be questioned, of course, but not so much 
their motivational efficacy.  
But how can civic virtue and citizens’ trust in the motives of fellow-citizens be sustained 
beyond such specific and unusual circumstances? Different republican accounts provide 
competing answers to this question. In so-called “Athenian” or “civic humanist” versions of 
republicanism, man is perceived as essentially a social and political animal. Civic virtue is thus 
seen as the highest rational good for the individual, and the congruence between the personal 
good and the regulative role of civic virtue is secured. The common good is understood as pre-
political, embedded either in the basic human good of sociability, or in a particular way of life 
and a shared identity as an ethical community.52   
Historically, republicans such as Montesquieu and Rousseau, as well as some of their critics, 
have argued that this view of civic virtue cannot be advanced in modern nation-states, and is 
restricted to smaller polities, such as the Greek polis or the city-states of the Renaissance.53 In 
                                                 
49 A related analysis of the role of civic virtue as a republican solution to the stability problem can be found in 
Lovett, “Machiavelli, Civic Virtue, And the Problem of Stability” [paper presented at the APSA 2013 Annual 
Meeting].  
50 This objection has been put forward to me, on separate occasions, by Paul Sagar as well as an anonymous 
reviewer. It is also a common liberal critique of republicanism more generally, for example in Geoffrey Brennan 
and Loren Lomasky, “Against Reviving Republicanism,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 5, no. 2 (2006): pp. 
221–52. 
51 Nelson Mandela, “..I am Prepared to Die”, (11 June 1964). Transcript found in the British Library Magna Carta 
Collection, http://www.bl.uk/collection-items/nelson-mandelas-speech-i-am-prepared-to-die-at-the-rivonia-trial 
[accessed 22nd July 2016] 
52 See for example Michael Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,” Political Theory 12, 
no. 1 (1984), pp. 81–96; Charles Taylor, “Why Democracy Needs Patriotism,” in For Love of Country: Debating 
the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Joshua Cohen (Beacon Press, 1996), pp. 119–21. 
53 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws [1748], trans. Anne M Cohler, Basia C Miller, and Harold Stone 
(Cambridge University Press, 1989). For an excellent account of these debates in the 18th and 19th Century, see 
Jacob T. Levy, “Beyond Publius: Montesquieu, Liberal Republicanism and the Small-Republic Thesis,” History 
of Political Thought 27, no. 1 (2006): pp. 50–90. 
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response, some liberal nationalists, sympathetic to republican citizenship, argue that under the 
conditions of modernity civic virtue can only be maintained through a cultural national 
identity.54 According to this argument, nation-states are the only political units large enough to 
sustain a modern political system, while at the same time maintaining a shared identity as a 
resource of civic virtue. As we saw above, however, this account faces the problem of the 
incompatibility between cultural national identities and political boundaries. 
To avoid this problem, civic republicans maintain that the link between nationalism and civic 
patriotism is historically contingent. The common good is seen not as an objective pre-political 
good, but as the result of democratic interpretation.55 Insofar as civic republicanism has an 
account of a shared collective identity, it interprets this identity as a public culture of particular 
political traditions, practices and histories. Thus unlike the ethical community account, the 
shared view of the good is not a pre-political given, nor is it meant to be seen as fully 
encompassing of any individual ethical identity. The political culture of the well-ordered 
republican polity maintains the civic virtue of citizens through the socialization into the 
political norms of non-domination, albeit in their particular form within the local political 
tradition, social norms, cultural traditions, and historical examples.56 
The structural similarity of this account to the Rawlsian one should not be surprising. Rawls 
explicitly states that his political liberalism is fully compatible to non-perfectionist versions of 
republicanism, and recent contributors to the debate have pointed to strong affinities between 
these accounts.57 The interpretation of Rawls as a civic republican can only go so far, however. 
As I pointed out above, Rawls is indeterminate and abstract about the nature of the political 
public culture, to a point where it is not clear whether his account can indeed serve as a solution 
to the stability problem. As De Francisco notes in a recent critique, Rawls’s motivational 
dualism, in which “the motivation for social justice (what prompts citizens to exhibit civic 
virtue) is different from, and independent of, the motivation for the creation and pursuit of the 
private good” is too weak to account for the level of civic participation required to maintain 
political freedom.58 Civic republicanism, on the other hand, embeds both private and public 
motivation in a shared interest of non-domination, and is therefore less susceptible to this 
charge. 
The PMA now takes the following form: 
                                                 
54 See for example David Miller, “Republicanism, National Identity and Europe,” in Republicanism and Political 
Theory, ed. Cécile Laborde and John Maynor (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), pp. 133-158 at p. 148. 
55 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), chapter 6; See also Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the 
Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
56 Maurizio Viroli, For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 
1995); Cécile Laborde, “From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism,” British Journal of Political Science 32, no. 04 
(2002), pp. 591–612. 
57 PL, 205; Justice as Fairness, 142. See for example Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and 
Republican Liberalism (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 186–190, and his “Citizenship as 
Fairness”; Andrés De Francisco, “A Republican Interpretation of the Late Rawls”, pp. 270–88; contra Maurizio 
Viroli, Republicanism (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002), p. 61. 
58 De Francisco, “A Republican Interpretation of the Late Rawls”, pp. 283-287. 
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1.  Cosmopolitanism about justice calls for the extension of the ideal of social justice 
beyond the boundaries of republics. 
2. The ideal of social justice requires, as a necessary precondition, a widespread sense 
of civic virtue (M) among citizens.   
3. The necessary sense of civic virtue is present in well-ordered republics as a 
consequence of a historically situated political culture (F). 
4. There is no equivalent for a shared political culture beyond the boundaries of well-
ordered republics. 
From 1-4, it follows that 
5. The ideal of social justice cannot be stable beyond the boundaries of republics. 
Therefore, given the stability problem, 
Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism is not fully justified. 
 
This version, I argue, is the most plausible among the three accounts of the PMA. It 
supplements the Rawlsian account with the necessary explanation for the particularity of the 
political culture, without reducing it to cultural affinity as in some versions of liberal 
nationalism.  
It is important to note, however, that civic republicanism is not inherently antagonistic to 
cosmopolitanism. Indeed, some recent theorists have drawn upon the republican conception of 
social justice as the reduction of domination to support cosmopolitan accounts of global 
justice.59 The anti-cosmopolitanism of the republican solution to the stability problem is, 
therefore, not self-evident. Moreover, a republican rejection of a cosmopolitan theory of justice 
does not entail a rejection of all normative accounts of international justice between political 
communities, for the same reason that a Rawlsian rejection of a cosmopolitan theory of justice 
is consistent with endorsing the Law of Peoples.   
Nevertheless, I wish to argue here that if my interpretation of the civic republican solution is 
accurate, and given the absence of a global political culture equivalent to that which exists 
within republics, at least three concerns should be raised among civic republicans with regards 
to justice-based cosmopolitanism.  
The first worry is that, absent a global political culture, a cosmopolitan ideal of social justice 
would require unrealistic levels of altruism. As Pettit writes in his “Republican Law of 
Peoples”, the cosmopolitanism ideal would be utopian  
                                                 
59 See for example James Bohman, “Republican Cosmopolitanism” Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 3 
(2004): pp. 336–352; Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí, Legal Republicanism: National and International 
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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…in the sense that states, in particular the richer representative states, would have to be 
saintly – in effect, they would have to be controlled by saintly peoples – in order to 
provide robustly for the satisfaction of the ideal. The world in which states operated 
like that would be a more perfect world than ours but psychological and institutional 
realities make it into a scenario we can hardly rely on being able to attain.60 
Pettit does not specify here why cosmopolitan justice, but not social justice within the state, 
would require unrealistic levels of altruism. In more recently published work, however, there 
are some clues that, importantly, point in the direction of the PMA. First, Pettit sees state 
sovereignty as a necessary condition for non-domination, as it reflects the self-determination 
of a democratic people. Since trust is in short supply across cultural divides, there will be “less 
likelihood of establishing those important unelected authorities… who could credibly claim to 
make decisions in line with shared standards”, and thus “the cause of democracy, articulated 
in terms of freedom, argues for a world of many states.”61 Following this thought, Pettit argues 
that states are obliged not to use their citizens’ tax revenue towards the needs of other people 
“except when those citizens explicitly or implicitly demand this, or support it as an implication 
of a separate demand.”62 Given the motivational limits on social justice, the cosmopolitan ideal 
is realizable only if people become more other-regarding than they currently are – in other 
words, assuming away the stability problem - or if political institutions act against their 
people’s expressed will.    
The second and related concern is that cosmopolitan ideals of justice would require global 
political institutions for their creation and implementation, and these, in turn, risk becoming 
themselves sources of domination and arbitrary power. The danger lurks in the lack of a global 
equivalent of active citizenship, which in the civic republican account carries a motivational 
precondition of civic virtue and a sense of belonging to a polity. Without a political culture and 
tradition to provide the motivation to engage and criticize these political institutions, there is a 
risk of them operating against the democratic will of the people. This, correspondently, will 
have a negative effect on citizens’ trust towards allegiance to these institutions, seeing them as 
alien dominating forces rather than a representation of the democratic will.63 
Note that this republican concern need not assume that the ideal of cosmopolitan justice 
requires a global leviathan. Indeed, many, if not most contemporary cosmopolitans explicitly 
reject the notion that their theories require the establishment of a global equivalent to the 
sovereign state, and restrict their prescriptions to global institutions  addressing specific policy 
areas (for example, taxation, migration, or development policies). 64 Nevertheless, insofar as 
cosmopolitan ideals of justice are meant to be serve as a stable foundation for political action, 
and not merely as voluntary guidelines for sovereign states, they would require at least some 
                                                 
60 Philip Pettit, “A Republican Law of Peoples,” European Journal of Political Theory 9, no. 1 (2010), pp. 70-94 
at p. 86. 
61 Philip Pettit, Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2014), p. 158. 
62 Ibid., p. 184. Pettit believes that the ideal of non-domination between self-determining states is a more incentive-
compatible, and thus a more motivationally stable ideal.  
63 Ibid., 169–170. 
64 Although it may be doubtful whether these positions are coherent; see for example Luke Ulaş, “Transforming 
(but Not Transcending) the State System? On Statist Cosmopolitanism,” Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy, (forthcoming). 
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of these supra-national institutions to  have political authority over the relevant domains. Given 
that republicans question the existence of a global public culture that would facilitate civic 
engagement with these institutions, the worry with regards to domination is not unfounded 
even if we restrict the authority of these institutions to specific policy areas: consider, for 
example, the political power held by the World Trade Organization over weak states. 
A third and final concern is that the diffusion of patriotic concern for compatriots would have 
negative consequences for the relationship between citizens. As Richard Miller argues, 
extending the relationship of civic friendship globally would undermine the relationship of 
trust among citizens. Miller interprets the cosmopolitan ideal of justice as allowing no partiality 
towards one’s compatriots, and thus the needs of more needy foreigners take precedence. As 
the disadvantaged citizens of a political society no longer see their compatriots as committed 
to their protection from domination, and since there is a “psychologically inevitable limit” on 
the levels of trust and respect in a domestic society without this special concern between 
compatriots, this will undermine the basis for cooperation in society and will generate forms 
of objectionable domination.65  
These three concern are not, of course, knock-down objections to justice-based 
cosmopolitanism. It may well be, as I suggest below, that cosmopolitans will be willing to bite 
the bullet and accept that the cause of global justice requires the establishment of prima facie 
dominating institutions, or the undermining of social trust in affluent societies.  Nor do these 
concerns exclude the possibility of a theory of global justice compatible with the republican 
focus on civic virtue as a solution to the stability problem. They do point, however, to a 
potential tension between the civic republican account and cosmopolitan theories of social 
justice. If the civic republican solution to the stability problem is plausible, there is reason to 
think that the cosmopolitan ideal is not fully justified. 
 4 Three Cosmopolitan Objections 
Cosmopolitans about justice would want to resist the conclusion above. In this final section, I 
turn to consider three cosmopolitan objections to the PMA, which challenge, respectively, the 
three premises of the argument. 
4.1. Against the motivational precondition premise 
This premise maintains that the normative ideal of social justice requires, as a necessary 
precondition, a widespread other-regarding motivation among participants in the social scheme 
in order to be stable. The objections to this premise deny that the stability of the normative 
ideal is dependent on this motivational precondition.  
The first challenge to this premise comes from those who deny that the justification of 
normative ideals is in any way dependent or constrained by facts about human motivation. One 
might argue, following G.A. Cohen and David Estlund, that normative ideals can be justified 
regardless of any facts that pertain to their implementation, and indeed may be held true even 
                                                 
65 See Richard W. Miller, “Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 27, no. 
3 (1998), pp. 210–214. 
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if they are impossible to implement.66 This position is in deep methodological disagreement 
with the one advanced by the PMA, first and foremost as it presents a radically different 
understanding of the role of normative political philosophy.67 While I do not see this as a 
particularly helpful way of thinking about either political philosophy or social justice, the 
rejection of this methodological position is well beyond the scope of this article. I am willing 
to concede, therefore, that social justice as understood by the PMA would not count, in Cohen’s 
terms, as a “fundamental principle of justice”, while still maintaining that a conception of social 
justice is not fully justified unless it can be stable. Some cosmopolitans may wish to endorse 
Cohen’s understanding of justice. However, insofar as cosmopolitans seek to advance a 
normative, action-guiding theory, with a commitment to a concrete political ideal of the global 
order, and as such view cosmopolitanism as more than an impossibly utopian ideal in the 
Cohenite sense, they should not be tempted to follow this line of thought.  
This challenge could be formulated more plausibly, however, if it focused on sensitivity not to 
facts in general, but facts about motivation in particular. Critics may concede that the full 
justification of normative ideals need to take into account “hard” facts about the world, but that 
allowing facts about motivation to constrain normative ideals would be capitulating to 
selfishness or bad faith.68 On the level of individual moral duties, it would certainly seem at 
least prima facie wrong to allow an agent’s lack of motivation to constrain what is morally 
required of her. Yet this is not the challenge posed by the PMA, where the stability problem is 
the result of a lack of assurance between generally well-motivated individual agents. In other 
words, the stability problem effects the full justification of cosmopolitanism as a normative 
political ideal, if not as an ethical ideal.69  
Daniel Weinstock provides a different, more substantive line of objection when he argues that 
nationalist theorists “overestimate the degree to which members of national communities agree 
to the sacrifices that life in a modern democracy involves out of fellow feeling”.70 These 
behaviors are always observed within the coercive institutions of the state, which are both 
responsible for generating and sustaining the appropriate motivations and provide them with 
content and direction. We simply cannot know how people would act absent these institutions. 
The PMA cannot, therefore, serve as an argument against cosmopolitanism, because it cannot 
show that the same political institutions that generate and sustain these behaviors within nation-
                                                 
66 See Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality; David Estlund, “Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of Political 
Philosophy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 39, no. 3 (2011): pp. 207–37; David Estlund, “Utopophobia,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 42, no. 2 (2014): pp. 113–34. 
67 An excellent discussion of this point can be found in Andrew Mason, “What Is the Point of Justice?,” Utilitas 
24, no. 4 (2012): pp. 525–47. 
68 Estlund “Human Nature”; Holly Lawford-Smith, “Understanding Political Feasibility,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 21, no. 3 (2013): 243–259; For recent objections to this argument, see David Wiens, “Motivational 
Limitations on the Demands of Justice,” European Journal of Political Theory 15, no. 3 (2016): pp. 333-352; 
Brian Carey, “Justice for Jerks: Human Nature, Selfishness and Non-Compliance,” Social Theory and Practice 
(forthcoming). 
69 On this distinction, see Edward Hall, “Political Realism and Fact-Sensitivity,” Res Publica 19, no. 2 (2012): 
pp. 173–81. 
70 Daniel Weinstock, “Motivating the Global Demos,” Metaphilosophy 40, no. 1 (2009): pp. 92-108 at p. 93. 
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states cannot be extended to the global level, relying on analogous global coercive 
institutions.71  
Weinstock’s argument is well-aimed at versions of the PMA which assume the naturalness of 
civic motivation, or rely on one some innate idea of natural partiality towards compatriots. This 
may, then, be a strong argument against the nationalist or the civic humanist anti-cosmopolitan. 
Yet it does not, I argue, pose a problem for the civic republican version I defend. Civic 
republicans need not assume the naturalness of civic virtue, and indeed place much emphasis 
on the transformational power of institutions for citizens’ motivation. For this reason, 
Weinstock’s objection, thus understood, does not challenge the republican argument that civic 
motivation is required for the stability of social justice, only the supposed limits to its scope. 
This, however, leaves the motivational precondition premise untouched.  
A reformulation of this particular objection, while not offered by Weinstock himself, does 
challenge the motivational precondition premise more explicitly. One may argue that the 
justification of social justice institutions should not rely on any strong assumptions regarding 
individuals’ other-regarding motives, and that in any case the stability of social justice does not 
depend on such motives. This is not to say, implausibly, that people are incapable of having 
such other-regarding motives; but as a methodological point, the theorist need not rely on such 
assumptions. This argument has a long history in the liberal tradition, from the Enlightenment 
argument of a “constitution for knaves” which harnesses the avarice of people towards a 
common good to, the methodological assumptions of social choice theorists.72  
Once again, I would argue that the civic republican account is better placed to address these 
objections than the Rawlsian or nationalist accounts, as the relationship between each 
individual’s prudential motives in avoiding domination and the public good is more clearly 
sustained. In principle, therefore, civic republicanism is not in tension with viewing civic virtue 
as enlightened self-interest.  
Nevertheless, some worries arise when political institutions overtly rely on self-interest alone, 
even the enlightened kind. First, without internalizing the norms of public culture, compliance 
becomes conditional on the relative pay-off of defecting. Unless the rewards for compliance or 
the sanctions for non-compliance are high enough to tilt the balance, they will simply be 
incorporated into citizens’ rational calculations. Second, civic republicans worry that this 
approach is a self-fulfilling prophecy, since people also value the way they are perceived by 
others. Viewing citizens as moved by self-interested alone may be damaging for the stability 
of social institutions, as belief in this fact undermines social trust.73 Third, constructing social 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 96–100; For a recent extension of this argument, see his “Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Unpacking the 
Arguments,” in Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Canada and the World, ed. Will Kymlicka and Kathryn Walker 
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maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave; though, at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a 
maxim should be true in politics which is false in fact”. For a sophisticated recent version of this line of argument, 
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Solidarity in Diverse Societies, Oxford University Press (forthcoming). 
73 See Lisa Herzog, “Distributive Justice, Feasibility Gridlocks, and the Harmfulness of Economic Ideology,” 
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institutions for knaves “can have the effect of labelling all relevant parties, including the 
naturally compliant, as potential deviants.”74 People can no longer expect their compliance to 
be seen as a result of anything other than a response to incentives, and they may feel alienated 
and undervalued. Relying instead on civic virtue based on the public culture, with the 
institutional mechanisms aimed at strengthening it instead of diminishing it, is an 
instrumentally better way to achieve stable compliance with the social institutions of justice.   
4.2. Against the generating feature premise 
Objections to the generating feature premise concede that social justice requires the widespread 
existence of civic virtue for the stability of social institutions, but reject the claim that this 
motivation is necessarily generated by any feature of political society, be it national identity or 
a historically particular political culture. The source of motivation, instead, lies in the validity 
of the normative ideal itself. As Habermas’s theory of constitutional patriotism is an influential 
version of this objection, it will be the focus the following discussion.75   
While national identity was historically important for the rise of the liberal democratic nation-
state, Habermas maintains that under current historical conditions it is politically dangerous. 
Instead of relying on a shared national culture as the source of patriotic allegiance, 
constitutional patriotism seeks to “uncouple” patriotic loyalty from its particular cultural 
foundations, whether defined in ethnic national terms or as loyalty to the patrie. The allegiance 
in patriotism is redirected from the particular institutions and culture of the state to the general 
principles and values these institutions embody.76  
The precise challenge of constitutional patriotism to the PMA, however, is not that a common 
public culture is not necessary for the stability of political institutions. Rather, constitutional 
patriots argue that this culture must be understood as the particular political manifestation of 
universal normative values. Insofar as the critique is pointed towards collective identities which 
are based on ethnic kinship, or substantive ethical accounts of human flourishing, constitutional 
patriotism and civic republicanism seem to be in agreement. The point of contention, if there 
is one, lies elsewhere: does the sense of patriotic identification with the political culture reflects 
primarily an endorsement of the universal principles, represented in contextual practice  (as 
argued by constitutional patriots), or rather an identification with the particular, historically 
situated way in which these values are manifested (as argued by civic republicans)?  
One standard way to reject constitutional patriotism in favor of civic republicanism is to argue 
that a reliance on universal values as the source of civic virtue would be motivationally 
impotent. In his critique of Habermas, Viroli argues that “[t]he commonality based on shared 
universal values… is too distant and too general… its chances of winning a rhetorical contest 
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do not seem high”.77 In a similar vein, Bernard Yack and Margaret Canovan argue that 
Habermas’s own account of constitutional patriotism is not as universalist as it claims to be, as 
it arises as a reaction to a particular national history – in this case, the horrors of German 
fascism and the re-unification of East and West Germany.78 The upshot of this argument seems 
to be that the supposed universalism of constitutional patriotism is nothing more than 
particularism in disguise. Constitutional patriotism, therefore, is either too weak or too strong.  
This, I believe, is an uncharitable reading of constitutional patriotism, assuming that it is 
committed to the idea that attachment to general principles must be without reference to 
political practice or historical particularities, and without being addressed to any particular 
audience. There is no reason to think this interpretation is correct. As Müller writes, this 
objection “presumes that some pristine universalism, untainted by particularity of any sort, is 
actually attainable somehow – and that all else is more or less the same normatively”.79  I take 
constitutional patriots to claim, instead, that particular institutional and cultural manifestations 
of universal values are not replaced by universal values, but are rather constrained by them. In 
accordance with a recent sympathetic account of constitutional liberalism, this would mean 
that a “shared experience of history can count as reasons in a civic political community as long 
as they do not contravene the basic principles of political justice”.80 
This interpretation of constitutional patriotism is what drives the objection to the PMA. 
However, even in this revised form it still faces a serious problem. Since it turns out that the 
normative value of motivational attachment to any particular political culture is conditional on 
its compatibility with independently valid general norms, constitutional patriots seem unable 
to account for why citizens would ever have an attachment to their particular political culture. 
Given that the same universally valid principles could be embodied in different institutional 
contexts, what explains, for example, why a Norwegian would identify with Norway’s welfare 
state rather than Sweden’s?  If constitutional patriotism is intended to serve as an alternative 
source of civic motivation, then it is a problem that it cannot provide a conceptually clear 
account of a citizen’s civic motivation towards her own polity.81  
The civic republican case against constitutional patriotism, therefore, is that it takes for granted 
an existing bounded political space, or else it is otherwise unable to supply the motivational 
preconditions for stable political institutions.82 Some critics argue that any argument for 
constitutional patriotism is circular; it needs to be underpinned by a “people” or 
“transgenerational political community” which recognizes the state as its own, and “thereby 
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confer upon it the legitimacy and power it needs”.83 Civic republicans need not go that far in 
exaggerating the difference between their position and constitutional patriotism; nor must they 
claim that the requirement of a historically embedded political culture assumes either an 
uncritical endorsement of this culture or the historical process that brought it about.84 On the 
contrary: a good republican citizen must adopt a critical stance towards the political culture 
and political institutions of her country, because they are hers. The patriotic slogan, “my 
country, right or wrong”, is thus interpreted not as blind loyalty to state institutions, but as a 
civic obligation towards immanent critique. Nevertheless, even this critical variation sees civic 
virtue as attached to a particular public culture.  
4.3. Against the factual claim  
Suppose then that opponents of the PMA concede the first two premises: social justice requires 
widespread civic motivation to be stable, and this can only be generated and sustained by a 
shared political culture. Even conceding these points, the argument remains vulnerable to 
refutations of it factual claim; this premise, recall, maintains that a political culture and 
collective identity (the generating feature F) does not exist beyond bounded societies. There 
are two ways to object to this premise. The first is to challenge its empirical basis, and argue 
that a global public culture, a collective identity, or something relevantly similar, already exists. 
The second is to argue that a global public culture is not conceptually impossible, and therefore 
the PMA is unjustifiably status-quo biased. 
In the first version of this objection, critics point to three sources leading to the emergence of 
global, supranational and transnational forms of political cultures and allegiances. First, they 
point to supranational political institutions, most prominently the European Union, as 
generating a new sense of political identity and solidarity beyond the nation-state; Second, they 
point to the effects of new forms of global cultural influences, economic transactions and media 
representation on the social identities of individuals worldwide, leading them to see themselves 
increasingly as “citizens of the world”; And third, they point to social phenomena such as dual 
nationals, diaspora communities and international migration as transnational sources for global 
solidarity which subverts the paradigmatic state-bounded political community. 
These empirical developments are undeniable, and have significant political and normative 
implications. However, it is not obvious that the most plausible interpretation of these 
phenomena poses a challenge to the factual claim made by the PMA. Take for example the 
European Union. While the idea of an ‘ever close union’ is central to this institution, and despite 
theoretical and philosophical support for the idea of a “European People”, the data is far from 
clear: Only 2% of EU citizens view themselves as primarily “Europeans”, and only 6% regard 
their European identity more important than their national identity.85 Globally speaking, only 
7.8% of those surveyed in a recent research report that their sense of belonging is to “the world 
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as a whole”.86 Some suggest that these sentiments are on the rise, and perhaps they are. But 
they do not support the claim that a global equivalent to the political identity of bounded 
communities currently exists. 
One may argue, of course, that these public opinion polls should be taken with a healthy dose 
of skepticism; even if we can be certain that all respondents’ understanding of the question is 
similar, this at most reflects their subjective sense of identity, and not the objective sense in 
which their habits, relationships and behaviors have changed.87 Yet it is important to reiterate 
here that civic republicans’ central claim is not that people do not, or cannot, have multiple 
allegiances, conflicting values, or ethical views that extend beyond the boundaries of the state. 
The argument, rather, is that even if some individuals hold these views, the existence of a 
shared political culture and identity within the state generates and sustains the necessary trust 
and solidarity for the stability of social justice.  
Perhaps this reply is overly status-quo biased, and cosmopolitans need only demonstrate that a 
global political culture of the relevant kind is feasibly achievable, not that it currently exists. 
Unless we take the view that the different political cultures of the world are intrinsically 
incompatible, we have no reason to deny the possibility that existing cultural differences would 
become irrelevant to the question of political identity, much in the same way ethnic and 
religious difference have (albeit imperfectly) become within the national context. And certainly 
globally shared identity is not conceptually impossible.88 As I argued above, civic republicans 
see political culture as the result of an historical political process, so solidarity between 
compatriots cannot be argued to be “natural”. Why must we think that these processes are 
impossible beyond the boundaries of the nation state?89 
This is the strongest argument against the PMA, but it is not necessarily a fatal one. While the 
technical feasibility of a global public culture is beyond question, one may raise questions about 
the normative feasibility of the project, that is, the moral costs involved in collective identity 
construction.90 Analytically, at least three categories of moral costs are relevant with regards 
to the cosmopolitan end-state – that is, a world in which a cosmopolitan equivalent to a 
collective political identity exists: 
1. Moral costs of the cosmopolitan end-state itself. 
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2. Moral costs of transitioning to a cosmopolitan identity. 
3. Moral opportunity costs of trying to create a cosmopolitan identity.  
The first category refers to the cost that will be incurred were the cosmopolitan world to become 
a reality. As nationalist and communitarian critics argue, a single global political culture would 
involve the dissolution of particularistic identities, which is a loss in two ways: first, because 
these identities are valuable in themselves, and second, because a plurality of particularistic 
identities is valuable.91 This objection is not entirely open to civic republicans, however: as 
was indicated above, political culture in civic republicanism is not an all-encompassing 
practical identity, and is fully compatible with diverse private and communal conceptions of 
the good, to be protected by the status of citizenship. An all-encompassing cosmopolitan 
political identity would possibly remain objectionable due to its dominating potential, but 
cosmopolitans are not required to endorse such end-goal.  
Nevertheless, even if we reject the first category of moral costs, this does not imply that costs 
of transition may be disregarded. I here follow Juha Räikkä and Alan Buchanan in arguing that 
“moral accessibility” is a necessary desideratum of a normative theory: the ideal state of affairs, 
desirable as it may be in itself, must not be achieved through actions that would be morally too 
costly.92 Indeed, precisely given that national cultures and identities are socially constructed 
should lead to doubt whether this process could be morally justifiable. The historical process 
in which really existing collective political identities were constructed involved what today 
would be considered serious violations of human and minority rights. These included, to name 
but a few practices: the promotion of false national myths; forced suppression of local cultures 
and languages; wars of dominance between competing ethnic groups; and in some extreme 
cases, forced relocation of populations.  
I am not suggesting, of course, that the construction of a global political identity must follow 
the bloody history of nation building. First, even if this were the case, cosmopolitans may 
plausibly argue that these costs, while real, are justified all things considered. Cosmopolitans 
may also rightly point out to more acceptable paths of collective identity formation, such as 
cosmopolitan education or market-led integration.93 One may be sceptical with regards to the 
achievability and stability of these strategies on a global scale – as I argued above, their success 
even in the relatively integrated, culturally similar and heavily funded project of a European 
Identity is a mixed bag – but this should not, in itself, preclude the duty of attempting to do so.  
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This leads to the third category, which could be best described as one of moral opportunity 
costs.94 Even morally innocuous paths towards a global political culture would require 
resources, political engagement, a reorientation of institutional focus, and sustaining effort. 
While different political identities do not necessarily exist in a zero-sum game, it would be 
foolish to ignore that, as some cosmopolitans argue, the construction and maintenance of 
national identities require the weakening of cosmopolitan identification, just as the construction 
and maintenance of cosmopolitan identity will weaken national identification.95 Given the 
uncertainty of constructing a global political culture, attempting to create a global analogue of 
the domestic political culture, and failing, may undermine the motivational basis for social 
justice where it currently (if imperfectly) exists. The republican concern here is that not only 
will cosmopolitan identity construction fall short of providing the motivational basis for the 
sacrifices required by social justice, for the reasons discussed above, but in addition its 
construction will undermine the motivational efficacy of local political identities.96 While 
currently existing political identities may have been formed illiberally, and would, in an ideal 
world, cease to exist, they are for better or for worse central loci of group solidarity necessary 
to the advancement of social justice.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
Civic republicanism provides the most plausible interpretation of the political motivation 
objection to cosmopolitanism. It is therefore the argument that cosmopolitans need to refute in 
order to sustain their position as a robust political ideal. As I have shown in the last section of 
this article, the most promising route for cosmopolitans towards this end would be to challenge 
the factual claim at the heart of the PMA and argue that even if a global public culture does not 
currently exist, it might exist. In these concluding remarks, I would like to consider the 
implications of this move for cosmopolitan theory. 
The main implication of this argument is that, given the cumulative weight of the three 
categories of moral costs, cosmopolitans should provide a motivational basis for stable 
institutions that mitigates these costs, or else they remain susceptible to the objection made by 
civic republicanism. Whether such route exists is an open question, and it has been somewhat 
of a blind spot for liberal cosmopolitan theorists. This may be changing, as recent contributions 
to the global justice literature have placed more emphasis on institutional stability more 
generally, and on political motivation more specifically. For these positions, my argument here 
should be seen as a friendly amendment, clarifying the best interpretation of the problem they 
aim to address, and leading to stable institutional answers to the most pressing global ethical 
and political questions.97  
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This reorientation of focus by cosmopolitan theorists is important especially given the 
alternatives. If no route to cosmopolitanism that mitigates its costs is suggested, cosmopolitan 
theory is faced with a difficult dilemma: either bracket away the question of political 
implementation, thus treating cosmopolitanism as a moral ideal with little practical 
significance, or radicalize it, arguing that the potential costs of creating a global political culture 
are outweighed by the severe injustice of the current world order.98 While this last option would 
require a considerable shift in cosmopolitan theory, it is certainly not without appeal. The 
upshot of my account, in this case, would be as a plea for consistency; if real cosmopolitanism 
requires such radical trade-offs, these implications need to at least be made explicit.99  
 
                                                 
98 For a recent statement of this position, see Richard J. Arneson, “Extreme Cosmopolitanisms Defended,” Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, (forthcoming),  
99 I would like to thank Richard Bellamy and Cécile Laborde for their comments and guidance on my doctoral 
project, from which this paper originates. Many thanks as well to the editors and referees at Social Theory and 
Practice for their constructive and challenging feedback, which greatly improved the paper. Earlier versions of 
the article were presented at the UCL Political Theory Workshop (December 2013), Brave New World 
Postgraduate Conference at the University of Manchester (June 2013), Academia.edu online session (August 
2015), and the Postdoctoral Political Thought Forum, University of Cambridge (December 2015). I would like to 
thank all of the participants for their comments, and in particular Sara Amighetti, David Axelsen, Brian Carey, 
Laura Lo Coco, Karin Kuhlemann, Nick Martin, Luke Ulaş, and Sam Zeitlin for providing written comments and 
critiques. Special thanks to Alasia Nuti for her ongoing support. Funding for the research period in which the early 
version of this article was written was provided by the UCL Overseas Trust and the Anglo-Israel Association’s 
Kenneth Lindsay Scholarship. 
 
